James Gardner and Antoni Abad i Ninet on Comparative Federalism in the United States and Spain
Welcome to UBLaw Conversations, a production of University at Buffalo Law School. Today is April 21, 2009, and I'm James Milles. Our guests today are James Gardner, UB Law School, and Antonii Abad i Ninet, visiting scholar, UB Law. Professors Gardner and Ninet are interviewed here by Rick Su, UB Law.
"Federalism Under Conditions of Asymmetrical Subnational Claims for Autonomy: the Case of Spain"
Abstract:
In
the Madisonian tradition of constitutional design, the foundation of a
sustainable federalism is thought to be a scientifically precise
balancing of national and subnational power. Experience shows, however,
that national and subnational actors in highly diverse systems are
capable of developing a rich array of extraconstitutional methods of
mutual influence, so that the formal, constitutionalized balance of
power rarely settles the question of the actual balance of power
between levels of government. A more important factor in ensuring the
long-term sustainability of a meaningfully federal system is the degree
of symmetry across subnational units in their relation to the central
state. A comparison of the U.S. and Spain suggests that federalism is
most directly threatened when subnational units compete not
collectively with the central state, thereby checking its power, but
with each other, a condition that furnishes the central state with
opportunities to exploit subnational rivalries in ways that risk
genuine, long-term destabilization.
The theme music is "Brazilian Nights" by Jack Jezzro, and is available through the Podsafe Music Network. Please join us again next time for another conversation from University at Buffalo Law School.
UBLaw20090421.mp3
Playing time: 50:36
